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Abstract 
 
This paper describes and analyses the creation and development of an Academic Health 
Science Centre (AHSC) as a major organizational innovation diffusing in the health 
knowledge economy, internationally.  Drawing on an institutionalist model utilized in an 
earlier study of a failed merger in the USA (Kitchener, 2002), we explore empirically 
why the creation of this new AHSC in the UK produced very different organizational 
outcomes.  Whereas institutionalist framing predicts ‘sedimented’ instability and 
repeated contest between managerialist and embedded (and ultimately, dominant) 
professional logics, the higher levels of clinical-academic engagement in our case exerted 
‘upwards’ institutional pressure, creating a more stable, collaborative form.  Our paper 
challenges and develops the institutionalist model, and explores the possibility of 
’counter-colonization’ through a new organizational form invented in the academic-
clinical domain. 
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2 
Introduction 
The creation of knowledge-mobilising organizations is of increasing importance in a 
developing knowledge economy.  Linked to societal needs to drive economic growth, 
governments have sought to steer science policy within a so-called ‘triple helix’ of 
university-industry-government collaboration (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000).  In this 
context, the recent innovation of Academic Health Science (AHS) organizations in the 
biomedical and life sciences sector is expected to play an important strategic role.  
Intended to intensify knowledge exchange and mobilisation, these organizations are 
complex ‘hybrid’ settings, integrating world-class universities and major hospitals, 
designed to combine divergent missions of biomedical research, clinical care, and 
professional education. 
While much previous work has explored the dynamics of Knowledge Intensive Firms 
(Alvesson, 2004; Starbuck, 1992), the creation of a new organizational form to intensify 
knowledge mobilisation is of particular interest for organizational scholars.  Despite the 
growing importance of emerging AHS organizations diffusing internationally, they are 
under-researched, particularly from a social science perspective.  A notable exception is 
Kitchener’s (2002) organizational study of a failed AHS merger between University of 
California San Francisco (UCSF) and Stanford University.  Drawing on institutional 
theory, Kitchener (2002) analyses the merger-demerger process as driven by escalating 
contest between a managerialist logic and a ‘semi-submerged’ but embedded 
professional logic.  This unstable, ‘sedimented’ configuration led to repeated clashes, 
with attempts to bridge these logics and their associated actors ultimately failing.  
Similarly, Kastor’s (2004) historical account of governance ‘turmoil’ in two AHS settings 
(at the University of Pennsylvania and Johns Hopkins University) finds they were 
undermined by conflict and crisis, although arising from clashes between divergent 
clinical and academic logics. 
By contrast, in our empirical study of the creation of a new Academic Health Science 
Centre (AHSC) in the UK, we find higher levels of professional engagement exerted 
strong ‘upwards’ institutional pressure.  Whereas institutionalist framing predicts 
‘sedimented’ instability and contest, our case displays a very different process and 
outcome.  Instead of contest between dominant managerialist and repressed professional 
logics, we find a process of professional ‘counter-colonization’ overtook and subsumed 
managerialist logics, producing a new organizational form invented in the professional 
domain. 
Our paper contributes to the literature by elucidating relational dynamics of 
institutional work operating at meso and macro levels.  Whereas recent developments in 
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institutional work reveal important, yet often ‘invisible’ aspects of professional practices 
and emotions at micro levels (Currie, Lockett, Finn, Martin, & Waring, 2012; 
Lawrence, Suddaby, & Leca, 2009; Voronov & Vince, 2012), our analysis reveals that 
the macro and meso levels of analysis also need to be taken into account, including the 
diffusion of new and professionally dominated organizational forms. We comment on 
the cognitive and emotional aspects of undertaking such institutional work that has been 
under-explored in much of the literature (Lawrence et al, 2013). 
We firstly situate our study in policy and theoretical literature, before describing our 
research methods and empirical case of a new, prestigious AHSC in the UK.  Using 
Kitchener’s (2002) four-stage model as an analytic framework, we compare our findings 
to his earlier study.  In discussing why the institutionalist explanations advanced by 
Kitchener (2002) were not replicated in our site, we argue that our finding of ‘counter-
colonization’ of the managerial domain results from strong professional influences at 
macro and meso levels.  Specifically, we highlight: firstly, the lateral, professionally dominated 
diffusion of the novel organizational form of the AHSC from elite exemplars 
internationally; secondly, powerful and expanding ‘upwards’ institutional pressure  produced 
through strong professional engagement at the meso level; thirdly, the nature of the 
institutional work undertaken in enacting the AHSC form locally, including emotional 
and cognitive elements. 
Literature review – policy and theoretical emplacement 
AHSCs have long been established in the USA and Canada.  However, this 
organizational form is now spreading internationally in Europe, Asia and Australia 
(Davies, 2009; Fisk et al., 2011).  AHSCs are major and novel knowledge-intensive 
organizations diffusing in the healthcare sector, with a tripartite mission of translating 
research into clinical practice, improving patient care, and advancing the quality of 
education and training (Watts, 2009).  Their core components are usually a medical 
school, associated clinical facilities and other health professional schools (Blumenthal, 
2005); however, in our case, the AHSC also brought in contributions from faculties 
across the university, including the humanities. 
AHSCs’ focus on knowledge mobilisation is part of an expanding economic and public 
policy emphasis on integrating research, education and service delivery at 
organizational and system levels (Walshe & Davies, 2013).  Within the health sector, 
‘translational research’ is an important policy and academic theme (Department of 
Health, 2011), intended to rapidly translate new scientific knowledge from ‘bench to 
bedside’ (HM Treasury, 2006).  In order to intensify knowledge mobilization across 
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institutional boundaries, the UK Department of Health established five prestigious 
AHSCs in 2009, connected to research-intensive universities.  This set of new AHSCs 
were intended to ‘transform healthcare’ by accelerating knowledge translation from 
‘world-class’ research into clinical and commercial impact (Department of Health, 
2008). 
In spite of such (potential) importance, much of the literature on AHSCs consists of 
opinion pieces and descriptive case studies focusing on governance and structural 
arrangements (Weiner, Culbertson, Jones, & Dickler, 2001), as well as rich descriptions 
of responses to external challenges (Abdelkak, 1996; Blumenthal & Meyer, 1996; Lozon 
& Fox, 2002).  Most of this literature does not draw on organizational or social science 
theory.  But one important exception is Kitchener’s (2002) study of the failed merger 
between the AHS organizations at Stanford and UCSF.  His paper examines how a 
managerialist and market-focused logic mobilised a ‘myth-like’ innovation of merger, 
intended to save costs and increase referrals.  This logic largely drew upon commercial 
ideas that were ‘oversold’ by management consultants and non-executive directors; 
however these ideas were persuasive as ‘managerial myths’ that attempted to create new 
bases of legitimacy.   
Kitchener (2002) explores the possibility that this merger could shift a traditional 
professional-bureaucratic logic to a market-managerial logic.  Yet his account describes 
institutionalised conflict between a challenging managerial group, and an embedded 
clinical group.  The newly merged organization’s management style was top-down and 
authoritarian, running against more consensual styles of these professionalised 
organizations.  Despite tactically conforming in the short term, ‘semi submerged’ but 
powerful professional groups (especially clinical academics) rejected the ‘merger myth’.  
Loosely coupled groups (such as research and education) were similarly disengaged, 
reflecting enduring professional autonomy and low buy-in to the merger.  As a 
consequence, the operational delivery mechanism of ‘integrated service lines’ became 
dysfunctional and quickly collapsed.  Compounding these difficulties, projected cost 
savings and anticipated revenue streams proved over-optimistic.  The merger lasted just 
seven months before the organizations rapidly de-merged, further adding to their 
financial problems. 
Kitchener (2002) explains these findings theoretically in a four-stage model which he 
developed from the case.  Firstly, the antecedents of market-based managerialism over 
professional dominance formed a core basis of legitimacy; secondly, the mobilisation of a 
managerial innovation (the ‘merger myth’) was driven by external change agents, such 
as management consultants and non-executive board members; thirdly the establishment 
of myths took place through institutional isomorphism and powerful managerial 
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reformers who attempted (but failed) to ‘fragment and repress’ the dominant 
professional logic; finally, organizational outcomes became fateful when the merger myth 
was ‘sedimented’ (Cooper, Hinings, Greenwood, & Brown, 1996) upon loosely coupled 
areas of professional autonomy.  Crucially, this ‘sedimented’ configuration led to 
perverse and unexpected outcomes as embedded professionalised elements retained the 
power to buffer themselves from and eventually abort the merger process. 
But is such sedimentation the only possible scenario?  In Choi et al.’s (2009; 2011, 2012) 
studies of the Karolinska AHSC merger, in Sweden, they similarly found tensions 
between competing economic-managerial and professional logics; like Kitchener’s 
(2002) case, the mobilisation of managerial logics could lead to professional 
disengagement and conflict (Choi & Brommels, 2009).  However, in the example of one 
clinical department, they found professional engagement was effectively stimulated by 
clinical leaders’ local re-interpretation of the ‘merger mandate’, by shared leadership 
approaches, and emergent (rather than managerially directed) change processes (Choi et 
al., 2012).  Choi et al. (2011: 21) argue that combining competing institutional logics in 
this way involves significant managerial work, involving strong relationship-based and 
“emotional pressure on physician managers in attempting to balance parallel institutional logics.”   
Overall, these studies find that competing institutional logics may significantly 
undermine managerial ambitions for AHSC integration.  Echoing Alford (1975), they 
point to the reaction and power of academic physicians as a major power centre.  Yet 
Choi et al.’s (2012) findings of productive ‘hybrid logics’ in one clinical department 
suggests possible alternatives to loose coupling and sedimentation.  Kitchener (2002) 
calls for replication studies to test his model and its relevance to other organizational 
innovations.  Although based on a single case study, and developed in the context of a 
merger between existing AHS organizations (rather than the creation of a new one), his 
theoretical framing provides an important social science perspective for exploring the 
rise and potential fall of AHS organizations.   
In the following section, we introduce our empirical study into the development of one 
AHSC in the UK, using Kitchener’s (2002) model as a framework to explore 
organizational processes and outcomes 
Methods 
Eastbury AHSC (a pseudonym) consists of a leading, multi-faculty university and three 
prestigious National Health Service (NHS) trusts (large teaching hospitals and associated 
clinical services).  Each of these institutions have international reputations for excellence, 
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based on specialist (tertiary) clinical services and research, spanning physical and mental 
healthcare.   Our data is drawn from in-depth interviews with academics, clinical 
leaders and managers, at intermediate (clinical directorates and academic divisions) and 
senior (trust executives and university governing council) levels.  Interviews were 
conducted over a period of 26 months, from January 2010 to March 2012, during an 
important developmental phase in which Eastbury moved from its early formation, 
following its designation in March 2009, to a more established federation, formalized 
through a legal partnership agreement.  During this developmental phase, 21 cross-
cutting ‘Clinical Academic Bundles’ (CABs) were established as a key integrating 
mechanism, bringing together scientists and other academics with clinicians and 
managers from across the AHSC.  These ‘bundles’ were based on assumed fit between 
local clinical and academic strengths, rather than consideration of scale, locations across 
sites, or their economic potential. 
In order to explore processes of change at both senior and intermediate levels, we 
interviewed senior managers and leaders across the four institutions, the AHSC 
partnership board (including the sovereign institutions’ CEOs and chairs), a partnership 
executive (led by senior academics, clinicians and managers), as well as senior academics 
and clinicians.  While waiting for ethical approval to begin interviews, we analysed and 
coded 740 archive documents (minutes, strategy and confidential documents) covering 
Eastbury’s formative period over a period 24 months.  Our interviews initially sampled 
participants at senior levels and across six of the new CABs, before we purposively 
focused in greater depth on three CABs that revealed contrasting dimensions of how the 
AHSC was working in practice.  This interview data was contextualized through 
participant observation, focused on a CAB directors’ forum.   
In total, we conducted 42 in-depth interviews using a semi-structured format, as well as  
informal interviews carried out over a period of three years.  We conducted follow-up 
interviews with two key informants to explore changes longitudinally.  Interviews were 
45 to 90 minutes in duration and most were jointly conducted by two researchers 
(authors).  All interviews were recorded and professionally transcribed, and we used 
QSR NVivo software to assist in the management and analysis of the full dataset.  Our 
analysis of the data firstly drew on the iterative qualitative methods proposed by Miles 
and Huberman (1994) to triangulate thematic codes and develop an empirically-
orientated framework.  We produced a project report which we fed back to the site and 
which formed the basis for our later papers.  We then developed our earlier analysis by 
re-analysing the full dataset; four authors re-analysed sets of transcripts independently, 
each producing narrative reports which we compared and discussed.  We developed our 
theoretical framework from this, bringing in theoretical perspectives and specifically 
comparing our case with Kitchener’s (2002) findings and theoretical model. 
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The creation of an AHSC 
Adopting an Initial Partnership Model  
The UK’s first AHSC at Imperial College London in 2007 (Davies, 2009) fuelled 
national interest in the concept and a policy decision by the Department of Health 
(2008) to develop and formally accredit five elite AHSCs.  Eastbury AHSC had an early 
vision of a partnership between sovereign institutions (rather than an integrated 
leadership model, as at Imperial).  Their formal partnership was announced in 2008 
after one year of exploratory collaboration between institutions.  After another year of 
preparation (including site visits to North American and European exemplars), Eastbury 
was accredited an AHSC 2009, following competition before an international panel of 
experts. 
Collaboration across Eastbury’s diverse institutions presented major challenges as well 
as potential benefits.  Its formation coincided with a ‘cold’ economic climate involving 
significant retrenchment in public services, so financial logics were an important 
consideration. 
“We come from a culture of competition…and of course the boards are very jealous, really 
worried about their hospitals, and they don’t want to give anything up, but we have massive 
duplication, which is lunacy.  We could generally save buckets of money which, since there’s a 
very cold wind blowing, would make us much more resilient.”   Senior clinical manager 
The AHSCs’ partner organizations are well established and, according to its 
confederation model, each organization retains its own governance arrangements, while 
the Eastbury partnership board formally reports to the sovereign institutions.  These 
arrangements provide safeguards for the partner organizations, allowing greater 
autonomy and financial independence than in vertically integrated governance models.  
However, they also reflect risk aversion, evident at board levels.   
“It was a model that (the university) argued for very strongly, our view always was that (the 
AHSC) shouldn’t be an umbrella (for) the totality of everything that goes on in four 
organizations, it’s more of a platform for the pursuit of particular strategic objectives…we’re just 
not experienced enough at this to know how to do it well.”   Senior academic manager 
Historical differences between the hospitals were also influential.  For example, the 
culture of one well-established hospital was perceived as wealthy, prestigious and middle 
class, in contrast to its neighbouring hospital, seen as poorer and working class.  
Accordingly there were underlying tensions between these hospitals.   
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“They have very different cultures.  If Apple and Microsoft decided to get together, it’s difficult 
to conceive, because they have very different cultures, so they would swap things but they might 
walk away from it.  You can’t walk away from this…the cultures are embedded in very long 
histories and coming from different places… so people walk the corridors feeling pretty paranoid 
and it’s a major problem.”  Senior clinical manager 
Despite such early tensions, the AHSC did not collapse, but moved towards increasing 
integration.  In explaining why this might be the case, we next explore the antecedents 
of the partnership and on the increasing engagement of senior executives, including 
academic and clinical leaders, operating across the confederation. 
Establishing and handling the AHSC as an institutional risk. 
Gaining accreditation conferred legitimacy on the partnership’s ambitions to be “in the 
top ten internationally”, as well addressing perceived strong competition between 
institutions (“if we don’t do this…we’ll slide back into the second division.  We have to be able to do 
this”).  But it was also perceived as presenting substantive as well as reputational risks. 
“Reputationally, it is totally exposed.  If it fails to deliver a successful AHSC it will damage 
(us) because we were legitimised as being one of the top five academic health schools in the 
country…. It now creates an expectation, and the danger is…there is a material risk that the 
AHSC actually steals space and resources, so it becomes subtractive rather than additive… 
(But) I think that there is a deep and profound sense of ownership of its purpose, I don’t know 
anybody who thinks, from the university perspective, this is a poor thing.”   Senior university 
manager 
Indeed, for the university, there was anxiety that its academic mission might be eroded 
by merging with large NHS trusts, whose focus on delivering a high volume of clinical 
services was likely to be dominant. 
“The risks in this for is losing control of the pursuit of our academic objectives, because the 
agenda in a largely public sector health environment is driven by all the stuff that we hear about 
on the news every night.  We felt quite strongly that we must protect the academic heart of 
(this).” Senior academic 
Mobilising the AHSC myth 
Accreditation followed a preparation phase in which academics and clinicians 
participated in workshops, conferences and working groups intended to seed the AHSC 
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as a ‘democratising’ venture.  One hospital had an established internal organization 
development team that worked to establish new clinical academic bundles.  
Other established AHSCs were important external role models which were used to 
benchmark Eastbury’s early design and development.  Small deputations of executives, 
together with clinical and academic leaders, visited leading AHSCs, such as Johns 
Hopkins (“with a degree of envy”), along with AHSC conferences.  These deputations read 
and circulated notable AHSC case studies, such as Kastor’s (2004) account of Turmoil at 
Penn and Hopkins.  Although management consultants were employed in a supporting 
capacity for internal projects, they did not play a significant role in developing Eastbury.  
Instead, AHSC leaders looked for inspiring examples of effective leadership, which they 
sought to emulate. 
“I was listening for every word around models of managerial structures.  (But) the key messages 
that were coming out of it – about leadership, not management instructions – were so powerful.  
There's something about people who can articulate that real world…you think, this guy knows 
what’s he’s talking about, you immediately have mutual empathy... ‘Warts and all’ really 
resonates, it probably influences me more than anything else.”  Senior hospital manager 
The Partnership Execut ive  – spanning s truc tural  boundaries  
As one senior doctor argued, Eastbury’s complex partnership arrangement demanded a 
leadership style capable of managing structural ambiguity:  
“It’s riddled with ambiguity…this spider’s web…a bit like the European Airbus, a 
collaboration of multiple EU countries making different bits of the aeroplane.  Senior doctor 
Accordingly, the partnership executive developed a team-based and collaborative 
approach, working across formal hierarchical boundaries through persuasion and 
building shared commitment to the AHSC vision. These more personal aspects of 
leadership team were noted by colleagues. 
“The formal position actually means (the director) is pretty much a castrated individual, that's 
what the lawyers do for you.  But what's happening, which is a very exciting agenda in 
Eastbury, is largely down to him, and the truth of the matter is that authority is much more 
earned than given.  You could have all the executive authority that you could fantasise about, but 
if people don't want to follow you, you're in trouble.  Whereas you could have very little 
executive authority formally, but become very influential because people want to follow you.”  
Senior manager 
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So despite a formal structure seen as inhibiting, an important development was the 
emergence of a cadre of academic and clinical leaders in the partnership executive, 
committed to converting the AHSC vision into reality.  They strongly identified with 
Eastbury, regarding the AHSC not as a ‘managerial myth’, but a compelling model of 
clinical-academic collaboration, which they trusted and sought to develop.  
“If you look at the core team, there's very strong emotional commitment to this.  I mean (the 
director) is an amazing bloke, we would all sort of go to the stake for him, because he's straight.  
There is absolutely no doubting that he's working his cotton socks off and has done for years 
now to achieve this.  He's an absolutely stellar bloke, a fantastic leader.  And the other people on 
the team are very strong.  They all get out of bed for the right reason - you certainly feel it 
around the table… I mean they inevitably are sort of friendships but the purpose of it all is 
stronger than friendship – the dominant reason is that we've got to achieve this, totally and 
utterly.” Senior clinician 
Such emotional commitment became increasingly important.  In contrast to the more 
cautious managerial stance evident in the sovereign institutions, an emerging academic-
clinical coalition committed to integration across the partnership, shaped strategic 
thinking.  This was accelerated in the new mental health CABs, when the mental health 
trust CEO and the academic dean of psychiatry collaborated to restructure their 
organizations, creating seven cross-cutting mental health CABs.  These CABs were 
tasked with developing team-based leadership models, comprised of senior clinicians 
(from across disciplines) academics and managers. 
Other techniques used to establish collaboration included weekly meetings between 
partnership executives, designed to establish trust, build a shared group identity, and 
create an ‘Eastbury mindset’ for thinking about the whole AHSC. 
“It’s having all these meetings together and giving people tasks to do.  (The director) dishes out 
these Eastbury tasks, and when you're given an AHSC task it’s quite interesting, isn’t it, 
because you have to think well hang on, this is an AHSC task, it’s not about my (hospital).  It’s 
very interesting.”  Senior clinician. 
‘Cl ini ca l  Academic  Bundles ’  – de l iver ing the  AHSC miss ion 
CABs were designed as confederation-wide operational units, in which academic 
researchers and clinicians came together to operationalise the tripartite mission.  21 
CABs were developed, covering all clinical specialties and academic groups.  CABs were 
required to develop their own operating and leadership model, and to have these 
formally accredited within a broad operating framework. 
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Cardiovascular CAB 
The Cardiovascular CAB was seen as a vanguard ‘bundle’ in which scientists, clinicians 
and academics across the institutions were first brought together.  Led by a group of 
visionary cardiologists, the CAB actively established a model of collaboration.  Despite a 
long history of competition and ‘all out wars’ between their units, academics and 
clinicians engaged passionately in creating a unifying vision and operational model. 
 
“We take four cardiac units that have been in intense competition and we try and integrate all of 
that.” Senior clinician 
 
Antecedent 
 
An important antecedent here is that cardiologists across the sites recognised a risk of 
their units ‘withering on the vine’ as advances in technology shifted referrals to less 
specialised hospitals.  They saw the AHSC as an opportunity to ‘reinvent’ themselves as 
an entrepreneurial and innovative ‘world-class service’ 
  
“If the AHSC hadn't existed we would have had to do exactly the same things (because) the 
bread and butter of what we do is beginning to disappear…we couldn’t continue the way we 
were and survive…We all saw the fact that the AHSCs suck money out of all the other 
hospitals…this was the only game in town.  If we didn't get together and make this work, we 
were going to wither on the vine.” Senior clinician 
Establishing an indigenous version of the ‘AHSC myth’ 
 
They developed a representational model for their CAB, which they conceptualised as a 
heart-like ‘engine’ for collaboration and innovation, to connect and energise the 
activities of clinicians and academics across their organizational ‘silos’.  This became 
central to their approach to change. 
 
“Our model was of an engine…at the centre of our CAB… a way of getting anyone who had 
expertise in that area, to get to know each other and to interact, basic scientists interacting with 
an interventional cardiologist… Anyone who’s interested in heart failure is welcome to come.” 
Senior academic 
 
As one cardiologist described it, they were most proud of their ‘engine’ model and yet 
anxious about it, as they saw their whole project hinged upon it. 
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“The only way you can release the creativity of the combined (institutions) is if your basic 
scientists get in the same room as your clinical guy.  We have a great clinical heart failure guy 
and the first time his thematic group met he met a basic scientist who knew about cloning cells 
(in a related area), he didn't know the guy existed and for the first time he was sat in a room 
with him, that's how you suddenly get towards clinical excellence and teaching.”  Senior 
clinician 
 
This model was central not just to their CAB leadership style, but their approach to 
managing ‘upwards’.  They strongly resisted pressure to conform to single leadership 
models suggested from site visits to other AHSCs.  Insisting on their team leadership 
model they had devised, they established a leadership group representing their different 
professions and clinical areas.  This shared leadership model was influential in Eastbury, 
and later led to similarly shared patterns of leadership being adopted across all CABs.   
 
“There was a big push to have individual leaders of the CABs... we were put under enormous 
pressure, and we said no.  And interestingly they've all changed their minds.  Well (the idea) 
came from us, but at the time we were seen as the bad boys.  We have an academic lead and the 
clinical director, it gives balance, we added yet another clinical and academic director (from 
across the hospitals), and then we added the general managers from both sites and a lead nurse, 
and that was the group that really forged.” Senior clinician 
 
They similarly resisted management pressure to produce operational documents and 
“15,000 slides PowerPoint presentations”, concentrating their efforts on the major challenges 
they perceived of building engagement and a ‘culture change’ needed to create a fully 
functioning CAB. 
 
“We spent two years just giving the message that this is our vision, this is the way we’re going.  
We started to introduce a joint audit session, joint this, joint that, to start a cultural change, and 
I'm proud of that… We have resisted writing big documents and we’ve been rather boisterous in 
the fact that we’ve said, no, we're not going to do it.”  Senior academic 
 
They established joint appointment panels for new positions, and the CAB leaders 
visibly wore new AHSC-branded identity badges, instead of their own institution’s 
brand, as a simple act that “actually makes a big difference”.  When potential internal 
conflicts arose within the CAB, its leadership team handled this through an ‘Eastbury 
mindset’.   
 
“One of the ‘cardios’ has been playing games and tried to switch from one institution to the 
other, and we said no, we are (the AHSC), we’re not playing these games between institutions.  
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We think as one organization.  No - we’re having none of it.   This is about culture 
change…we need to think of ourselves as being a different organization.”   
 
Mobilising leadership across contrasting models – achieving cultural change 
 
This CAB is a positive example of a group that established a vision for itself through a 
strong leadership team.  But how was the AHSC ‘myth’ mobilised in this case? 
 
Its pattern of mobilisation was different to that identified by Kitchener (2002).  Instead 
of senior managers, non-executive directors and management consultants being central 
to the ‘selling’, we find increasing tensions between the boards of the sovereign 
institutions, which were becoming anxious and risk averse, and the CAB leadership 
team of academics and clinicians whose enthusiasm for the AHSC overtook that of the 
senior managers. 
 
“There was a year’s delay, they were too frightened to give up anything.  The clinical 
enthusiasm ran ahead of the managerial enthusiasm, it completely crossed over.  We became very 
enthusiastic and the executives became very cautious and concerned, and that led to a lot of 
trauma.  We were saying, give us an integrated budget, let us run... if we fail sack us, but let us 
go.  But they can't, they just can't do it.  And to really allow us to be world-class you have to 
allow us to fly and take some risks along the way… So we’re coming out of this lull period, it 
was mayhem.”  Senior clinician 
 
An important source of influence was a trusted senior doctor working with the 
partnership executive, whose energy and vision for the AHSC the CAB leaders regarded 
as ‘inspirational’.  Although he came from one hospital originally, his wider role across 
Eastbury was seen as significant. 
 
“He's the guy who’s got it right, he says we will achieve nothing unless people forget that they're 
working on site A or site B but they're working for (Eastbury).  He has a mantra which says, 
‘think (Eastbury)’…well if you could have him at every single meeting, it would make the entire 
process work.” 
 
Similarly, they saw the AHSC idea as being mobilised not through their sovereign 
institutions (which the CAB leaders saw as increasingly remote, anxious, and 
preoccupied by bureaucracy), but through regular meetings between the partnership 
executive and the leaders of all 21 CABs, focused on emerging ideas about how to 
develop the AHSC. 
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“That should be where the powerhouse of (Eastbury) comes from, because if that group decides 
something and it’s not allowed, there could be absolute mayhem.  So I hope, slowly but surely, 
the CAB leaders group becomes the lead strategy group of (Eastbury) to allow things to happen.  
It would be very dumb of the four sovereign organizations to ignore the CAB leaders group.”  
Senior academic 
 
Outcomes 
 
Although historically, the four clinical units comprising this CAB had been in conflict, 
these groups and the academic unit came together in creating a compelling materiality 
to the CAB, based not on merger myth, but through interlocking systems with actual 
changes in behaviour. 
 
“Historically there have been all out wars between the two hospitals and specifically cardiology, 
big time war, very, very competitive.  Now they've gradually disappeared… Barriers are 
breaking down, and a lot of this is culture… these (clinicians) have agreed that they're going to 
work on both sites, and that's a massive, massive moment, when I think of the warring that's 
gone on.”  Senior academic 
 
Instead of the CAB buffering itself from AHSC activity, we see strong local motivation 
and engagement to convert the tripartite vision into ‘reality’.  As the professional logics 
in this CAB became animated and more dominant, they came into tension with 
increasingly cautious managerialist logics operating at board levels.  Yet instead of being 
repressed by or conforming to managerial caution, they exerted upwards influence upon 
senior managers as well as laterally in other CABs, presenting a bottom-up and clinically 
engaged model. 
Diabetes CAB 
Whereas the Cardiovascular CAB brought together powerful and competing units, the 
Diabetes CAB was formed from a diffuse collection of smaller specialties.  Its clinical 
and academic leaders saw the potential of their ‘bundling’ into a new CAB as presenting 
an opportunity for establishing a more powerful presence and identity, within the 
AHSC and externally.   
Antecedent 
 
A key driver was the ambition of senior academics and clinicians to recreate and 
redefine diabetes and its related services from “a bit of a mishmash” of disparate services 
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(diabetes, endocrinology, nutrition and related specialties) to a potentially powerful 
organizational entity, capable of winning competitive advantage. 
 
“That's why we’re doing it, because it gives the opportunity to recreate ourselves as an entity, 
which gives us visibility and a position at meetings where big decisions are made… (to be) listed 
by name when you go on to the AHSC websites.  So for very pragmatic reasons, we want to be 
an entity.”  Senior clinician 
 
There was strong internal determination and ambition for the CAB driven especially by 
a leading academic director, supported by senior clinicians, who sought to concentrate  
resources across their organizational boundaries. 
 
“I really pushed my colleagues, because I felt that that would be an opportunity for us to tell 
(executives) how to set up the CABs, rather than them tell us.  When we heard about the AHSC 
taking away all the barriers, I said: look guys, this is the opportunity we've been waiting for.”  
Senior academic 
 
Establishing an indigenous version of the ‘AHSC myth’ 
 
CAB leaders sought to establish a strong unified model, pulling together “bits out of 
different academic and clinical divisions, and putting them in one place.  But in contrast to 
cardiology’s team-based approach, the diabetes CAB adopted a more hierarchical form, 
shaped especially by its academic director.  Although this director had initially wished to 
lead the CAB as its sole academic-clinical director, (inspired by the Johns Hopkins 
model), this model was modified by AHSC executives who now promoted a shared 
leadership model.  Accordingly, they also appointed a senior clinician (a diabetologist) as 
a clinical director.  In this CAB, then, the leadership role was shared between a lead 
academic-physician and a lead clinician, both from within a single discipline, with 
managers in a supportive role. 
 
“I said I wanted to do it on my own because I didn't want to work with the other person who 
(originally) put their name up.  The (executives) then said we want you to have a partner, and 
that works…I can have the ideas and (the other director) can see how it could be made to 
happen.  I mean sometimes we disagree, but deep down we don’t disagree about anything 
fundamentally.” Senior academic 
 
Their vision was for a diabetes-focused CAB that should represent the whole spectrum 
of diabetes, and so be a model for other long-term conditions.  Accordingly, they 
developed a model that put diabetes firmly at its centre, with ‘feelers’ out to bring in 
related specialties. 
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“The ambition is for a sort of grand Johns Hopkins’ type model, (but) there's definite cultural 
differences in terms of how (our different groups) operate.  If three football teams were to 
suddenly decide they were going to become one football team…” Senior clinician 
 
Yet despite internal tensions about this model (“we've got all of ophthalmology looking 
suspiciously at where the leadership is taking them”), achieving the organizational advantage of 
a unified CAB created strong incentives for clinicians and academics to collaborate.  
Core drivers, therefore, were of gaining competitive advantage and creating a powerful 
unified identity.  This new identity powerfully linked indigenous clinical and academic 
interests with a new, business-orientated mentality. 
 
“A lot of the early discussions were a bit of turf war about who was in and who was out, whose 
CVs are going to look good, who's got the money.  What you quickly realise is that CABs 
become a club aware of their own identity very quickly, and it is a formative identity…a force 
trying to influence wider privilege for itself.  I mean, essentially you become a business.” Senior 
clinician 
 
Mobilising leadership across contrasting models – achieving cultural change 
 
In the diabetes CAB, its leaders strongly identified with the AHSC vision and sought to 
establish it through a more hierarchical leadership approach, drawing on Johns Hopkins 
as a source of inspiration.  Nonetheless, the AHSC ‘myth’ was mobilised less by external 
influences that by an internal ambition to make use of the AHSC partnership “taking 
away all the barriers”.  The AHSC was perceived as an opportunity to create locally 
devised model, whose core features had been pre-conceived by the academic director 
and colleagues. 
 
“I've driven this, we had meetings long before we knew about the AHSC, saying that we wanted 
to pool into a single entity... I want to be in a position to say this is a model, because we should 
inform our management what we want to do and not have them tell us.”  Senior academic 
 
Interestingly, while an external consultant was used in this CAB’s early development 
(and had been experienced an ‘helpful’ in bringing together a range of parties and 
perspectives ‘into the room’), ideas for this CAB were mobilised neither by managers 
nor by external consultants, but by the two academic and clinical directors, regarded by 
some as operating in isolation from the wider CAB. 
 
“It’s gone from a big, wide breadth of activity to… it's suddenly condensed to a core black 
hole…a supernova.  Hopefully (the directors) will merge into a new style and get illuminated 
once they’ve come from that position.”  Senior clinician 
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Mobilising leadership ideas was similarly internally driven, as the voices of these role 
holders created a strong unified message, which some respondents described as 
drowning out other perspectives.  This approach exercised effective control across wider 
meetings of CAB members. 
 
“Their ability to dominate the conversation in the room, which prevents others from being able to 
interact or to make their own voices heard, is really quite extraordinary.  They talk people out of 
the room and maintain a sort of verbal dominance over the meeting and its membership.  To 
have any kind of impact at all you really need to punch your way to puncture this conversation.  
What you have is the ‘husband’ who comes home and is loud and dominant…at the same time 
there is the ‘quiet housewife’ who gets on with things behind the scenes.”   
 
A core dynamic in this CAB is of a ‘centripetal’ force, pulling disparate services into a 
deeper concentration of resources and activity, positioning diabetes as a newly dominant 
player.  This local interpretation of an AHSC ‘myth’ mobilised in this CAB is largely 
promoted by two powerful internal academics and clinicians, supported to varying 
degrees by other CAB participants.   
 
Outcomes 
 
Outcomes in this CAB were of increasing centralisation and dominance, driven by CAB 
leaders.  However, there were important questions about inclusivity, voice, and the 
degree of authentic sign-up to the process, with some respondents expressing concern 
about other staff and marginal perspectives being alienated.  Thus there was a sense of 
leaders pushing through a model which ‘backroom’ academics and ‘grassroots’ clinical 
staff were not authentically signed up to.   
 
Overall, this CAB started with a weaker power base and its collection of diverse groups 
meant its leadership and vision developed more slowly.  Yet here too we see professional 
logics becoming more dominant as a small grouping of senior clinical and academic 
leaders established a strong presence and created a combined brand, which they saw as 
useful in competing for resources.  The CAB’s development thereby reinforced 
professional logics and self-interests, increasing their power base.   
Mental health CAB 
A contrasting model in the Developmental Psychiatry CAB was based on realigned 
departments across the NHS mental health trust and the academic department of 
psychiatry.  This model developed after the chief executive and academic dean 
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reorganized their departments from geographically based (in the case of the hospital) to 
specialty-based ‘bundles’ to deliver the AHSC objectives. 
Antecedent – an embryonic AHSC 
 
An important precursor in this CAB was a historical tradition of collaboration between 
the academic institute and the mental health hospital, originating from their inception in 
the 1940s.  Respondents commented that they saw this historical relationship as an 
‘embryonic’ AHSC (“15 years ago, you wouldn’t have known which T-shirt the person was wearing 
– NHS or academic”).  This shared history was perceived as creating ‘readiness’ for the 
AHSC, in which many staff related to both the academic unit and the hospital. 
  
“There's been a long tradition of being paid nine tenths from (the university).  My colleagues are 
all in a similar arrangement – so in a sense that is a type of embryonic AHSC model. Our 
academic department relies on that close relationship; they get something from us – high-calibre 
people who obviously apply for these jobs because of their academic component.  They get a 
certain amount of kudos.  We were ready for that and it doesn't involve a radical change of 
culture, it means a type of clarification of our relationships and role, and we look to both sides.” 
Senior clinician 
 
Establishing an indigenous version of the ‘AHSC myth’ 
 
The CAB brought together separate services into a novel ‘bundle’, but the CAB’s 
academic and clinical leaders took a strongly relationship-focused approach, seeking to 
build a leadership team which represented disparate services and specialties.   
 
“Well our CAB is a novel entity in the sense that it brings together forensic psychiatry into a 
new relationship with learning disability and developmental disorders, so bringing disparate 
clinical services together.”  Senior clinician 
 
Interestingly, this early approach quickly became central for how the CAB then 
developed. 
 
“A combination of oh my gowd, how on earth are we going to make this blimmin’ work.  Who 
are our natural bedfellows intellectually; who can we actually work with?  We've got good 
inputs from our colleagues; a lot of inputs from across the piste in helping us form our vision… 
So we have a whole series of meetings where all those conversations take place and are kind of 
collated.  It’s changed how the team works.” Senior academic 
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In marked contrast to Eastbury’s originally preferred single director model, this CAB’s 
leadership team had four directors: an academic director, a service director (general 
manager), and two clinical directors, representing disparate services.  Unusually, the 
manager was seen to have an equal role in this leadership team, while the two clinical 
directors sought to integrate their disparate services.  As one clinical director explained, 
although her clinical department was a minor part of the CAB in terms of scale and 
resources, she and the other clinical director had persuasively argued for a joint 
appointment for the role. 
“We didn't know each other before this, and we didn't know whether or not the AHSC would 
go for the idea.  But our CAB is very diverse, so we thought we need people from both sides… 
So we had a conversation and it was a consensual arrangement we worked out between the two 
of us.  It was just about making sure that we’d have the right sort of clinical input into it… we 
have a big remit in terms of making sure that all service lines (integrate)” Senior clinician 
Despite this unusual team-based approach, (most other CABs across Eastbury had 
appointed one academic and one academic director), the directors of this CAB believed 
they had created an entity which fitted with their underlying clinical ethos and historical 
patterns of collaborating. 
“If you look back at our previous method of working, we were ready for this type of thing and so 
it suits our purpose.  So on that level we're singing from the same hymn sheet.”  Senior 
manager 
Moreover, they actively worked to diffuse their team-based model of collaboration 
across the CAB, thereby operationalising their vision through other multidisciplinary 
teams. 
“It needs to be a fairly flat hierarchy at the top.  Each one of those (Eastbury) agendas needs to 
be driven forward within a team; everybody basically needs to be respectful of those three 
overriding areas and the team needs to bring those issues to the table.  So the teaching, the 
research, the clinical excellence, producing results, measuring outcomes, all of that is abundantly 
clear - you need a team that can deliver and be respectful of that full range of outcomes.  I don't 
think it can work unless the ethos permeates through to at least the middle rank of clinicians, 
managers and researchers.”  Senior clinician 
Mobilising leadership between contrasting models – dynamic models of relations 
So how were the AHSC ideas mobilised in this case?  The CAB leaders took inspiration 
from the close partnership they observed between the mental health trust CEO and the 
academic dean, and attempted to emulate this as a model of shared leadership. 
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“(They have) integrity, ambition, they're respectful of their colleagues and approachable, 
articulate.  They evoke a certain amount of pride; they both credit the full range of (AHSC) 
activities.  They articulate the aims of the whole exercise very convincingly and coherently, and 
they're very good advocates.  It makes the whole project a lot easier to sell to the workforce.” 
Senior clinician 
Despite this influence and the realignment of their departments, CAB directors 
expressed frustration with wider institutional arrangements as managers and core 
functions (such as HR and finance) were seen as slowing the CABs’ potential to develop. 
“Because of stasis, the management procedures we have in place are very un-entrepreneurial.  
They say all the right things but they're risk-averse…so people are afraid to fail.  There’s not 
enough feeling amongst the managers at CAB level that they've got the power to do (things).  It’s 
always, ‘oh I better ask (the CEO)’.  The (institutions have) not said, you know what, you 
make a surplus, you can reinvest: a simple concept.”  Senior academic 
Similarly, the institutions’ arrangements for accrediting and monitoring CABs were 
seen, paradoxically, as obscuring the CAB’s focus on delivering their key clinical and 
academic objectives. 
“There is a risk we might become too focused on pleasing Eastbury, rather than addressing the 
priorities of the wider research and clinical establishments.  There might be a temptation 
sometimes to focus too much on keeping local accreditation bodies sweet....(other) managers 
whose role in life is to keep the hierarchy satisfied with progress.  But that may not be nearly so 
impressive to the outside world.” Senior academic 
Instead, directors described the most useful ideas coming from challenging but authentic 
exchanges with other CAB directors in the CAB leaders’ forum, whose focus on 
developing the AHSC model they regarded as key to their learning. 
 
“Clinicians or academics would be saying, I'm having problems with dealing with my business 
manager, how are you guys dealing with that?  Well I found that a really interesting 
conversation to have – until one of the Chief Executives wrote a letter saying, I hear you've been 
speaking out of turn.  Bloody ridiculous – everyone thinks, ‘sod it, what's the point?’  Instead of 
the institutional reaction being, ‘that's actually a healthy thing’, it was a slap down... You want 
to know how you deal with this situation, to learn from each other: ‘oh come on, that's rubbish’, 
or ‘what do you think?’” Senior clinician 
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Another source of mobilisation came through practical examples that produced changes 
in working practices and new areas of collaboration, which one academic described as 
‘transformational’.  
 
“You're here to help people, dude, that's the mission of this (Eastbury), and that's what you 
need to focus on.  So it’s terrific, it's transformation… So I've got my idea, test that out…grow 
some stem cells, transplant that to a mouse model, and then I'm going to transfer that up to a 
human model…to my brand new absolutely world-leading treatment.  I can do that now, you 
know. We’re doing it already, just fantastic.”  Senior academic 
 
Outcomes 
 
A key outcome for this CAB was to bring clinical and academic areas into close 
alignment, overcoming many (although not all) of the institutional barriers experienced 
by the physical health CABs.  Their model of working fitted with underlying patterns of 
collaboration amongst clinical and academic groups 
“For most clinicians certainly this whole exercise does make sense.  It’s not just a paper pushing 
exercise.  It does make sense to try to bring people together, and I think so far we've succeeded in 
doing that.” Senior clinician 
More broadly, this way of working facilitated links with other CABs in physical 
medicine, creating new opportunities for collaboration. 
“It's really improved our links with physical medicine, absolutely crucial.  A lot of the stuff we 
do is on brain development and, bizarrely, expertise in brain birth injury resides in psychiatry 
and not in neonatology.  So what we've been doing is inventing techniques for detecting brain 
damage from a caesarean section or very preterm.  So you've now got really rapid measures of 
your intervention, which we wouldn’t have had.”   Senior academic 
Fateful outcomes? ‘CABS Are Us’ 
Studying how the AHSC ‘myth’ was mobilised and established at CAB levels elucidates 
how embedded academic and clinical practices were influenced and changed through 
local adoption and enactment of the AHSC model.  As one senior clinician argued, the 
CAB-based model’s “inclusivity has made it much easier to sell, it’s made it quite a seductive 
concept” amongst diverse academic and clinical groups.  Indeed, the partnership 
executive depended upon these CAB-level developments. 
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“It’s fair to say that ‘CABS R Us’ – to use an American toy store’s name.  We do rely on that 
as being the fundamental vehicle of delivery, communication and dissemination… One of the 
questions I ask if I go to your CAB, I say to the nurse or research assistant, ‘how is it for you, 
has the earth moved for you yet?’  Would they say, ‘I've no idea what you're talking about’ or 
would they say, ‘I think I can see where we’re going - it could be quite exciting’”.  Senior 
academic 
But might these local adaptations have wider influence upon other CABs, or indeed 
‘upwards’ towards the institutions?  The declared intentions of the sovereign institutions 
to move from confederation model towards ever-closer integration and possible merger 
were significantly influenced by CABs’ progress towards as well as obstacles in delivering 
the AHSC vision.  The perceived successes of mental health CABs, in particular, in 
achieving Eastbury objectives became notable exemplars of effective AHSC operating.  
“They have taught us a huge amount and they are in no small measure responsible for the 
optimistic and dramatic circumstances that we now find ourselves in…They don't talk about 
divisions, they talk about CABs.  The management, clinical and academic leaders are aligned, 
it’s extraordinary.  That's not the case across the acute hospitals, so the model of the mental 
health CABs showed us what can be achieved.  It’s amazing, the enthusiasm and the 
commitment, it’s absolute magic.”  Senior clinician 
Whereas the physical health CABs’ stronger vertical governance arrangements within 
their trusts were seen as hindering these CABs’ progress, stronger lateral alignment of 
the mental health CABs was perceived as accelerating their development.  Their 
examples of innovating across historical divisions between mental and physical 
healthcare were persuasive, appearing to translate ‘myth-like’ AHSC ideals into tangible 
reality. 
“The other thing that's stunning is that they've really embraced this mental-physical interface… 
They have developed a screening tool which they use in the rheumatology clinics… It’s a 
challenge to the physical health trusts, (who) say look, we can't do this stuff, you can't move 
money from one trust to the other trust.  So that shows the inadequacies of the model of separate 
trusts and that has played a major part in changing people’s mindset.  These institutions are all 
going to merge in a new organization that brings everybody into the same place.  Well I call that 
revolutionary - it’s bloody revolutionary!”  Senior academic 
In contrast to notions of CABs merely implementing the AHSC’s originally conceived 
design, CABs had created and exerted strong ‘upwards’ pressure upon the sovereign 
institutions.  Through producing powerful inter-linkages between CABs and the 
partnership executive, emotionally-charged challenges to managerialist caution became 
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increasingly influential.  Senior managers and boards across the four institutions were 
persuaded to “go further, faster…sure that our futures are bound together,” at the time of writing 
proposing closer integration and public consultation on a possible merger.  
“Everybody will go banging on about how mergers fail… (but) how else could you make the 
CABs work?  Making the CABs work delivers the tripartite agenda.  The whole raison d'être of 
Eastbury was the mental-physical health interface…bringing mental and physical together to a 
level of fulfilment that is just not known about in the NHS.  We’re turning the CABs into the 
delivery vehicle – CABs can be engine rooms, and the reason we’re going to have to merge is so 
that the CABs can work properly.  I mean, ‘CABS are it’, they are a necessary condition for 
(our) success.  It turns out we've got to merge these hospitals to deliver that.”  Senior 
academic  
Unlike Kitchener’s (2002) case, then, the creation and mobilisation of the AHSC idea at 
Eastbury was driven by senior academics and clinicians whose high levels of 
engagement produced strong institutional pressure, converting its ‘myth-like’ vision into 
material ‘reality’.  Eastbury’s identity, branding and ‘clever’ logo were popular and 
quickly adopted by participants across the four institutions, with some academics, 
clinicians and managers preferring to put Eastbury as their ‘home’ institution (including 
in their publications.) 
“We can't just wake up one morning and say well actually it's all off...take away this logo, 
we're just going to back to the way we were.  It’s inconceivable…it’s difficult to convey the 
profoundness of these changes in so many dimensions.”  Senior clinician 
The clinical-academic innovation of CABs, then, became a key linking mechanism.  
Instead of creating sedimented and loosely-coupled areas of professional autonomy, 
CABs generated potent local ownership from clinicians and academics whose 
engagement at intermediate levels produced a counter-colonizing dynamic, accelerating 
the pace and scale of institutional change.  
Discussion and conclusion 
Comparing our case with Kitchener’s (2002) framework – establishing a new organizational form 
How might we analyse this empirical case which reveals a very different course than 
Kitchener suggests?  Rather than operational collapse and institutional demerger, we 
see closer integration moving towards merger.  Using Kitchener’s (2002) framework, our 
case elucidates key distinctions between the AHSC with Kitchener’s study.  We 
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summarise in Table 1 the key influences and mechanisms creating institutional change 
in our case. 
 
 Corporate level 
Partnership 
Executive Clinical Academic Bundles (CABs) 
A
N
T
E
C
E
D
E
N
T
S 
Structural 
influences 
4 sovereign 
institutions; 
strengthened 
governance 
arrangements; 
AHSC as a separate 
‘platform’ 
Overcoming 
structural 
barriers through 
influence & 
collaboration; 
developing 
leader-follower 
relations 
Cardiology: Tensions with structural barriers, caution & 
hierarchy 
 
Diabetes: AHSC should ‘remove all the barriers’; preferred 
single leader approach modified by AHSC 
 
Psychiatry: Strongly shaped by newly aligned academic and 
clinical services; team-based leadership model 
Prevailing 
logics 
Corporate 
governance systems; 
legal logics; 
competition with 
UK rival AHSCs  
 
Tripartite 
missions of 
academia, 
patient care & 
education; 
international 
rankings (‘top 10 
globally’) 
Cardiology: Clinical-academic excellence; entrepreneurialism 
& innovation 
 
Diabetes: Recreating a new clinical-academic entity; 
competitiveness & business logics 
 
Psychiatry: Clarifying & strengthening their original 
‘embryonic AHSC’; clinical-academic innovation 
Sources of 
influence 
AHSC institutional 
models; North 
American & 
European 
exemplars 
Impressive cases 
of leadership 
(e.g Johns 
Hopkins); 
cautionary case 
studies of AHSC 
failure 
Cardiology: Inspiring medical leadership 
 
Diabetes: CAB academic director; Johns Hopkins leadership 
model; internal CAB accreditation process 
 
Psychiatry: Inspiring shared leadership model (CEO & dean 
of psychiatry); dean’s previous work in AHSCs 
M
O
B
IL
IS
A
T
IO
N
 
Change 
agents 
Imperial AHSC & 
policy push; semi-
formal partnership 
board (some 
enthusiastic CEOs 
& Chairs); internal 
corporate functions 
Senior academic 
doctors; highly 
visible 
collaboration 
between mental 
health CEO and 
dean.  
Cardiology: Senior academics and clinicians working as a 
strongly unified team 
 
Diabetes: Dominant academic and clinical directors 
 
Psychiatry: Internal organizational consultants; CEO and 
dean; CAB leadership group. 
Leadership 
model 
Hierarchical 
control and parallel 
governance 
arrangements; 
limited delegated 
authority to AHSC 
executive & CABs 
 
Cadre of visibly 
committed 
group of 
clinicians & 
academics, 
supported by 
managers. Led 
by ‘inspiring’ 
academic 
doctors. 
Cardiology: Strong clinical-academic leadership team, 
supported by a balanced wider group, across specialties & 
sites 
 
Diabetes: Dominant, diabetes-centric pairing between 
academic director (strategic ideas) and clinician (with 
operational techniques) 
 
Psychiatry: ‘Flat and inclusive hierarchy’ in a 4 member 
leadership team; consensual decision-making & wider 
consultation 
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Relational 
dynamics 
Shared 
commitment to the 
AHSC, but 
divergent views 
about a model; 
increasing anxiety 
and caution; some 
strong relationships 
(e.g. mental health 
CEO and dean) 
Trust-based 
relations ‘you can 
feel’; shared 
leadership; sense 
of mutual 
mission,‘beyond 
friendships’ 
Cardiology: Cohesive leadership and decisions ‘we act as one 
organization’; refusal to comply with bureaucracy, creating 
‘trauma & mayhem’ 
 
Diabetes: Hegemony of diabetes, led by academic doctor; 
some groups marginalized & silenced through ‘verbal 
dominance’ 
 
Psychiatry: Developed strong team relations, extending to 
wider group; facilitation to ‘hear quieter voices’ 
E
ST
A
B
LI
SH
IN
G
 M
YT
H
S 
‘Myth-like’ 
adoption  
Inspired by North 
American AHSCs; 
preferred model of 
partnership reflects 
historical relations; 
opposes Imperial 
merger model 
 
‘CABs R Us’; 
Senior clinicians 
& academics 
develop 
innovative & 
inclusive CABs 
as the AHSC’s 
engine room; 
‘Everyone is in’ 
Cardiology: Vanguard CAB shaped as a heart-like ‘engine’; 
embodying the AHSC ‘as the middle bit driving everything else’ 
 
Diabetes: Creating a ‘supernova’ based on a (modified) Johns 
Hopkins model; creating a diabetes spectrum ’as a model for 
every other long term conditions’ 
Psychiatry: Re-establishing a valued ‘embryonic’ relationship 
through a multi-disciplinary leadership group, reflecting 
core mental health practices.  
Techniques 
in use 
Partnership 
agreement for 
AHSC as ‘a 
platform’ 
Early community-
building gives way 
to governance focus 
Weekly 
executive 
meetings; 
AHSC tasks; 
unusual & non-
bureaucratic 
CAB leadership 
meetings. 
Cardiology: 2-dimensional model of a heart-like engine as 
central to discussions; weekly meetings over 2 years; 
leadership group model practices of a ‘changed culture’ 
 
Diabetes: Breadth of initial activity shrinks to core leadership 
‘black hole’; verbal dominance forcing change ideas, with 
limited outside facilitation 
 
Psychiatry: Team development techniques, using internal 
facilitators and tools (Myers Briggs), stimulating exchange 
& relations 
Identity 
construct-ion 
Sovereign 
institutions & 
confederation as a 
platform, not an 
umbrella 
CABS R Us Cardiology: Wearing an AHSC identify badge makes a 
difference: ‘We are the AHSC’; ‘think Eastbury’ 
 
Diabetes: ‘Re-creating ourselves’ as a diabetes spectrum CAB; a 
new & powerful entity 
 
Psychiatry: Clarifying relationships;‘we have always been an 
(embryonic) AHSC 
Table 1 - Summary of key influences & drivers 
Firstly, the AHSC’s antecedents suggested a very different logic of accelerating research 
translation from ‘bench to bedside’ to improve clinical care, rather than the rationale of 
cost containment apparent in Kitchener’s (2002) account of merger between existing 
AHS organizations.  Interviews suggested there was high internal clinical and academic 
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legitimacy for the AHSC vision, ‘being in the top ten in the world’.  Although the 
AHSC was created in an economic context of financial retrenchment, a resulting 
austerity consciousness did not appear to affect the legitimacy of the AHSC vision.  
Instead, ‘moving upmarket’ was regarded as protecting patient and resource flows (as 
seen in the cardiology CAB).   
Furthermore ‘background’ antecedents in our case were interpreted and brought into 
play in different ways by local actors.  Structural influences proposed contrasting models of 
reinforcing (at governance levels) or overcoming institutional boundaries (in CABs and 
the partnership board).  Prevailing logics across groups similarly accentuated different 
underlying rationales: management logics were more legalistic and risk-averse while 
clinical and academic logics emphasised more collaborative and ‘hybrid’ evolution.  
Orientations to key sources of influence also varied, with executives looking internationally 
to institutional models; partnership board members focused on examples of leadership 
in elite North American AHSCs, as well as cautionary accounts; whereas emerging CAB 
leaders identified ‘inspiring’ local leaders, along with visible, collaborative leadership. 
Secondly, mobilisation of the organizational innovation originally arose through 
interactions between rival institutions.  The AHSC model was imported into the UK by 
the self-appointed AHSC at Imperial; this led to a policy push by the Department of 
Health (which steers the UK health sector more actively than the more market-
orientated USA system) to create and accredit a limited number of prestigious AHSCs, 
for which there was strong institutional competition.  Well-established settings such as 
Johns Hopkins were regarded as legitimate role models, strongly reinforced by 
‘impressive’ site visits.  AHSC status was thus regarded as signalling world-class quality, 
reputation and brand, and our site did not wish to be ‘pushed into the second division’. 
Managerial change agents, though, were less prominent in our case.  Management 
consultants played a supporting, but not a directing role; non-executive board members 
did not appear significant in mobilising change; while legal actors had a dampening 
effect on managerial enthusiasm for change.  Conversely, the AHSC model was 
mobilised by internal clinical and academic leadership.  Principal change agents were 
senior academic doctors and clinical-academic leaders, a few enthusiastic executives 
(such as the mental health trust CEO), and internal organizational development 
consultants, who focused on team- and relationship building.  Despite managerial efforts 
to retain hierarchical control, these senior clinicians and academics introduced shared, 
team-based leadership models (such as between the mental health trust CEO and the dean 
of psychiatry).  Consequently, an expanding cadre of clinical-managerial and academic-
managerial leaders developed, which formed strong alliances across institutional 
boundaries.   
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Relational dynamics, moreover, became increasingly salient in mobilising this development.  
Building strong relationships was seen as not merely incidental, but pivotal to converting 
AHSC ideals into ‘a reality’.  Within the partnership executive, members’ emotional 
commitment to the AHSC vision and to each other helped establish confidence and 
trust, (‘stronger than friendships…you can feel it around the table’).  Such emotional engagement 
was also important at CAB levels, as seen in the ‘trauma and mayhem’ between the 
cardiologists’ and their parent institutions, the mental health CAB’s enthusiasm for 
candid and shared engagement in building trust, and internal tensions within the 
diabetes CAB. 
Thirdly, the establishment of myths in our case does not appear in the form of ‘oversold’ 
managerial myths, driven by a managerialist field (see for instance, Bowles, 1997; Meyer 
& Rowan, 1977) but were improvised and developed internally as compelling local 
narratives.  The AHSC vision was mainly established by a middle to upper level cadre 
of doctors and academics, whose enthusiasm overtook that of senior managers.  Unlike 
the institutional myths of structures and practices described by Meyer & Rowan (1977), 
we find diverse practices of ‘myth making’ (Gabriel, 2008: 191-92; Kostera, 2008) across 
the AHSC, in the forms of improvised leadership models, new identity constructions, 
and idealistic yet plausible visions of an ‘exciting’ and ‘revolutionary’ future.  To support 
this work, techniques in use established new practices that were readily identified with the 
emerging AHSC.  Thus, while the formal authority of partnership executive and CABs 
had little formal authority (power was ‘castrated’) they established visible leadership 
teams that were seen as synonymous with the AHSC (‘we are the AHSC’).  Accordingly, 
emerging identity constructions, such as the slogan, ‘CABs R Us’ or the well-liked notion of 
having always been an ‘embryonic’ AHSC, seemed to reflect members’ lived 
experiences of creating the AHSC, as much as their future aspirations. 
Finally, organizational outcomes in Eastbury were not ‘sedimented’ and fateful, but 
supported by committed professional groupings established at CAB levels.  Unlike 
Kitchener’s (2002) account of ‘service lines’ that quickly collapsed, a major finding of 
our study is the engagement of core professional groups driving CABs as intermediate, 
linking structures across both the university and the hospitals.  Although managerial 
actors were less prominent, we find productive alliances, such as between the CEO of 
the mental health trust and the academic dean, along with examples of clinical-
academic-managerial coalitions in some CABs.  These high levels of clinical-academic 
engagement produced significant organizational change at CAB levels, as a 
consequence, exerting powerful ‘upwards’ pressure on the sovereign institutions, 
creating a more stable collaborative form.  Our particular focus on the first wave of 
CABs may not the reflect the wider picture across the AHSC (we sampled six ‘early 
adopters’ of the 21 CABs).  Nevertheless, instead of professional groups being either 
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decoupled from institutional change, or merely engaged at intermediate leadership 
levels, we find a powerful process of ‘counter-colonization’ which eventually convinced 
the sovereign institutions to propose fuller integration and possible merger.  
In summary, these findings contrast strongly with Kitchener’s (2002) account of top-
down and secretive managerial ‘fiat’.  Whereas his account briefly mentions, but 
discounts, the ‘social construction of a prestige cartel’ as a possible motivator for AHSC 
construction, this narrative was strongly present in our sites and helped mobilise internal 
legitimacy (‘a journey of passions’).  Instead of the antecedents asserting managerial logics, 
we find clinical-academic logics that gained strong local legitimacy; ideas were mobilised 
not through managerial change agents, but through lateral diffusion of ideas, promoted 
by clinical and academic leaders; the AHSC model was not externally imposed as a 
‘managerial myth’, but was internally constructed through practices of local myth-
creation.  Accordingly, the organizational outcomes took a very different course to 
Kitchener’s case.  We capture in Table 2 key distinctions between Kitchener’s analysis 
and our findings. 
 
 Kitchener’s framework, based on 
UCSF-Sanford Merger 
Comparison of Eastbury AHSC against 
Kitchener’s framework  
Antecedent Ascendancy of managerialist 
logics over professional 
dominance 
International AHSCs promoted 
clinical-academic logics which gained 
local legitimacy 
Mobilization Institutional change agents 
establish 'myth-like' innovations 
'Lateral' diffusion of innovation in 
clinical-academic domain, promoted by 
UK policymakers 
Establishment of Myths Combined insititutional 
isomorphy & managerial 
agency led to merger 
Upwards institutional pressure 
produced through strong professional 
engagement and managerial reactivity 
to external reputational legitimacy.  
Organizational Outcomes Fateful outcomes of myths 
'sedimented' on submerged 
professional logics (loosely 
coupled) 
Productive alliances of academic & 
clinical leadership creates counter-
colonization of managerial domain. 
Table 2 - Comparison to Kitchener’s (2002) framework 
Wider reflections on counter-colonization within the AHSC 
What might these findings elucidate more widely about institutional relations between 
managerialist and professional logics?  In overall terms, Kitchener’s (2002) 
institutionalist framing explores a well-recognised question of the distribution of power 
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within healthcare systems, and of conflict between different power blocs and their 
associated logics.  Yet recent scholarship suggests there may be highly varied patterns of 
relations between professional and managerial logics.  In studies of the Albertan 
healthcare field, for instance, Reay and Hinings (2005; 2009) find long-term coexistence 
between professional and managerial logics with neither becoming dominant, and 
tactics in place to achieve pragmatic working relations and avoid conflict.  Within the 
field of employment services, van Gestel and Hillebrand (2011)  suggest an oscillating 
pattern, as dominant logics switch over time, linked to wider changes in political control.  
Another pattern, in the health management literature, focuses on the development of 
hybrid clinical-managerial roles at the individual level (Doolin, 2002; Ewan Ferlie & 
Pettigrew, 1996; Fitzgerald & Kippist, 2009), often involving identity reconstruction 
(Doolin, 2002; Authors). 
Waring and Currie’s (2009) study of clinicians’ reactions to new corporate knowledge 
management systems found that besides patterns of evasion and resistance, clinical 
adaptation and co-optation to new managerialist systems were also  possible.  One 
clinical setting, for example, did not use the corporate knowledge management system 
but developed its own clinically led system, defended on quality grounds.  “Systems that 
were initially centralized and anchored within management practice become decentralised and re-anchored 
within medical practice, marginalising hospital risk managers from their own systems’ (Waring & 
Currie, 2009: 772).  Intriguingly, the authors suggest a pattern of ‘reverse colonization’ 
whereby professionals extend their jurisdiction, using “the tools of colonization…to challenge 
the authority and gain independence from the (managerial) colonizers” (Waring & Currie, 2009: 
774).  Their analysis is thus orientated towards managerialist techniques that overlap 
with traditional areas of clinical jurisdiction, at more micro organizational levels.  But 
can their notion of ‘reverse colonization’ be extended to the AHSC as a new 
organizational form? 
Our findings suggest a more expansive process of what we describe as ‘counter-
colonization’ operating at the macro (AHSC) and meso (CAB) organizational levels.  
Importantly, this process was not just enacted at micro levels, nor merely focused on 
reclaiming professional jurisdictions, as Waring and Currie (2009) suggest.  Like Choi et 
al.’s (2012) recent findings from one clinical department at Karolinska, we find the 
presence of professional engagement linked to emotional and relational work, actively 
developing the AHSC at a meso level.  But our concept of counter-colonization 
emphasises greater professional activity and ‘bottom-up’ influence than has previously 
been noted at more macro levels.  We suggest such counter-colonization in our case 
involved three interlinked processes of: lateral diffusion of an organizational model by 
professionals; ‘upwards’ institutional pressure from meso levels; and cognitive and 
emotional aspects of enacted institutional work. 
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Lateral diffusion of the macro organizational model within the clinical-academic domain internationally  
Successive reorganizations in UK healthcare have sought to reshape and managerialise 
professional work, inspired by politically-generated New Public Management (NPM) 
reforms (E. Ferlie, Ashburner, Fitzgerald, & Pettigrew, 1996).  However, the creation of 
AHSCs in the UK displays a different pattern.  Originating in the North American 
clinical-academic domain, AHSCs are based on the idea of rapidly translating scientific 
research into clinical practice, across institutional boundaries.  This (professionally 
appealing) idea was especially supported by the availability of a founding organizational 
model, namely the AHS organizations in North America (e.g. Johns Hopkins).  This 
elite and myth-like status of AHSCs was laterally diffused into the UK, originally 
through senior clinical-academic networks at Imperial AHSC, and later adopted by the 
management-policy domain through senior health policy networks at the Department of 
Health.  AHSCs remain unusual as an organizational form originating in the clinical-
academic domain, rather than the more typical political-managerialist inventions of 
NPM reforms. 
The meso level: ‘upwards’ institutional pressure from the CABs 
These lateral, macro-level influences in turn created a basis for the construction of CABs 
as a linking mechanism at meso-levels across the Eastbury AHSC; CABs which began to 
generate ‘upwards pressure’ on senior management and the governance level to 
accelerate the pace of development of the AHSC.  In our previous research studying 
interactions between professional and managerialist logics in a healthcare setting, we 
found micro-level reactions can produce escalating emotionally-charged conflict rising 
to undermine meso-level functioning.  For instance, ‘ideological loading’ and sustained 
emotions embedded in established positions may induce strong institutional pressure 
and organizational turbulence, potentially leading to organizational collapse (Authors).  
In the Eastbury case, by contrast, participants’ emotional and ideological engagement 
may be seen as ‘positively charged’ towards transforming the organization.  While there 
were instances of emotional ‘trauma’ and ‘mayhem’ in creating the AHSC, these were 
strongly future-orientated and ambitious (rather than defensive), geared towards ideals 
of creating ‘an exciting future’ for the emerging AHSC.  Dominated by senior 
academics and clinicians, rather than managers, the constructions of CABs at 
intermediate levels became crucial sites for advancing local ownership and vision.   
These developing professional logics exerted sustained and expanding institutional 
pressure across the AHSC, so ‘counter-colonizing’ the managerial domain. 
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Enacting institutional work: cognitive and emotional aspects 
Although the idea of AHSCs as a new organizational form diffused from original North 
American settings such as Johns Hopkins, there was no master plan to merely replicate 
these original models.  Instead, there was much evidence in Eastbury of participants 
adapting the idea to fit local relationships, of ‘learning by doing’, and using devices to 
reduce high levels of anxiety and uncertainty.  Visits to international comparator sites 
and the sharing of vivid case studies became important vehicles for building tacit 
knowledge and emotional commitment to the project amongst the senior leadership 
team.  Yet a combination of strong emotionally-invested engagement by professional 
groups, and their local adaptations of and identifications with CABs generated 
expanding ‘upwards’ pressure.  Lawrence et al (2013) have recently drawn attention to 
the cognitive and emotional issues which may arise in such processes of local enactment, 
and call for more empirical and theoretical investigation.  Within our study of such 
processes, the growth of emotional commitment and energy became central to the 
making the idea ‘a reality’, building on locally important values and practices.  Thus, the 
cardiovascular CABs’ ‘heart like’ model was devised and effectively employed as a 
motivating and reassuring trope.  The mental health CAB similarly displayed a pattern 
of path dependency, re-evoking a locally valued history of ‘having always been an 
embryonic AHSC’, linking this to their invention of team-based leadership which 
reflected clinically important characteristics of their multidisciplinary professional work. 
In summary, out case elucidates how high professional engagement at the meso level 
may powerfully interact with macro mechanisms, creating strong ‘upwards’ institutional 
pressure that stimulates organizational change.  We propose the concept of ‘counter-
colonization’ emphasises not merely the reclaiming of professional jurisdictions at micro 
levels, as Waring and Currie (2011) suggest, but more assertive professional expansions 
into managerial domains at meso and more macro levels.   
Our study suggests a fruitful, yet under-explored area for future research may be other 
examples of expanding professional domains, potentially involving new organizational 
forms, such as partnership-based organizations.  As we found in this case, such forms 
may be predicted to arise where elite professional groupings retain market or societal 
power.  Contrary to the managerialisation thesis, our study suggests certain limits to the 
managerial project, not least through the creation and diffusion of new organizational 
forms under the jurisdiction of elite professional groups. 
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